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Jacques Derrida and the faith in philosophy​[1]​


“Doit-on rendre raison du principe de raison?
La raison de la raison est-elle rationnelle?”​[2]​


1. Faith and philosophy
Faith and philosophy are often thought of as forming an opposition, which situates   religion, beliefs and faith on the one side, and philosophy, science, knowledge and reason on the other. This opposition is as old as philosophy itself. Already the pre-Socratics developed their philosophies – the first efforts to reach a total, all-encompassing and rational insight in reality – as an alternative to religious and mythical stories. Parmenides made a fundamental distinction between the road to truth and being, on the one hand, and the road to opinion and non-being on the other; Plato made the same distinction in terms of episteme vs. doxa.​[3]​ Within this opposition, science and philosophy are supposed to be searching for real and rational truth and certainty, whereas faith and religion belong to the minor realm of opinion and uncertainty. In Parmenides’ opinion philosophy has to search for an absolute truth concerning the whole of reality, and reason is the only reliable way to reach it. Accordingly, a grasp for totality and a faith in reason go hand in hand. Nevertheless, during a long period in the history of philosophy many efforts have been made to think faith and reason together, e.g. in medieval scholasticism. In modern times, however, especially in the period of the Enlightenment and onwards, reason and faith are strongly opposed to each other – an opposition which is still very influential. Many modern philosophers have believed that reason has its own foundation in itself and that it can do without faith. Through the 20th century the idea that reason can found itself has been seriously undermined within many philosophical movements. This development, as well as social and political reasons, has put the question of the relation between faith and reason back on the philosophical agenda – if it had ever disappeared from this agenda.
	One of the contemporary philosophers that has recently addressed this question in several texts, is Jacques Derrida.​[4]​ His work on religion has already been interpreted and introduced by several philosophers and theologians.​[5]​ Their interpretations are of a varying quality. However, they all ignore an important element in Derrida’s thoughts on faith and religion, namely a problematic inner tension with regard to the relation between the Enlightenment tradition and religious traditions. In this article I will analyze this tension and criticize it as well. To start with, Derrida’s starting point will be characterized (§ 2); then an analysis will be given of his ‘quasi-transcendental’ approach of faith and reason (§ 3) and of his problematic relation to traditions (§ 4); at the end the force of faith in philosophy will be discussed as well as the faith that is guiding Derrida’s deconstructions (§ 5) and the contrary effects of his thoughts with regard to tolerance and justice (§ 6).

2. Derrida’s starting point
Jacques Derrida problematizes the opposition between faith and reason, as he does all oppositions. In Faith and Knowledge Derrida even calls the belief in this opposition between reason and faith ‘naive’.​[6]​ He tries to think the relation between both from out of another scheme, from a point that seems to precede both religion and philosophy. Paradoxically, he makes this effort by still taking as his starting point the Enlightenment, or to be more precise, ‘a certain Enlightenment’ with reference to a text of Kant. In Faith and Knowledge he introduces this starting point as a ‘provisional evidence’:

“Let us also remember what, rightly or wrongly, I hold provisionally to be evident: whatever our relation to religion may be, and to this or that religion, we are not priests bound by a ministry, nor theologians, nor qualified, competent representatives of religion, nor enemies of religion as such, in the sense that certain so-called Enlightenment philosophers are thought to have been. But we also share, it seems to me, something else, – let us designate it cautiously – an unreserved taste, if not an unconditional preference, for what, in politics, is called republican democracy as a universalizable model, binding philosophy to the public ‘cause’, to the res publica, to ‘public-ness’, once again to the light of day, once again to the ‘lights’ of the Enlightenment, [aux Lumières], once again to the enlightened virtue of public space, emancipating it from all external power (non-lay, non-secular), for example from religious dogmatism, orthodoxy or authority (that is, from a certain rule of the doxa or of belief, which, however, does not mean of all faith). […] …we shall doubtless attempt to transpose, here and now, the circumspect and suspensive attitude, a certain epochè that consists – rightly or wrongly, for the issue is serious – in thinking religion or making it appear ‘within the limits of reason alone’.”​[7]​

This is the paradox that Derrida gives us here: on the one hand he tries to deconstruct and to overcome the opposition between faith and reason; but on the other hand he seems to prefer rational critique and emancipation above any religious tradition, which seems to be the same as a preference for reason above faith. Let us take a closer look at Derrida’s point of departure as well as at his deconstruction of the opposition between faith and reason.
	Several details in Derrida’s starting point need to be discussed. To start with, Derrida speaks in terms of ‘we’. In doing so, he refers – at least in first instance – to all the participants of the seminar at the Italian island Capri where Derrida gave the lecture I just quoted. This speaking in terms of ‘we’ also refers to a group of people who share Derrida’s basic assumptions, a group that can only be called ‘group’ or ‘we’ by excluding others. There is not necessarily something wrong with such an exclusion, on the contrary, it is unavoidable and it can give an insight into some major characteristics of Derrida’s work; but within his thoughts this exclusion of others might be problematic.
	Who is indicated by this ‘we’? Derrida states that ‘we’ do not share a simple rational critique and refusal of religion as such which can be found in ‘a certain tradition of Enlightenment’.​[8]​ What this ‘we’ does share is what Derrida puts forward in a careful and prudent way as ‘provisional’, but what at the same time is called unconditional, namely: ‘an unreserved taste, if not an unconditional preference’. A certain uncertainty and a certain certainty seem to go together here in a strange way: it is crystal clear that one can never be certain and should never be certain. Every theory, every statement and every belief has to be publicly criticizable. And to this extent, although Derrida is hesitant in calling deconstruction a critique, he does not seem to hesitate here about his adherence to rational critique.​[9]​
	Anyway, Derrida’s starting point is a preference for Enlightenment, for an Enlightenment that emancipates public space from religious authorities, an Enlightenment that tries to think religion, just as Kant has tried to do, ‘within the limits of reason alone’. So religion is thought here from the perspective of critical enlightened reason, and not the other way round. And then he asks himself what exactly this means: what can we make of this Kantian gesture today?​[10]​ Derrida surely does not simply repeat Kant, as is already clear when we read the subtitle of his lecture: “The two sources of ‘religion’ at the limits of reason alone”. Derrida does not try to think or to analyze religions in all their manifestations, but rather, he is looking for their origins, their sources. And these sources are to be found not within but at the limits of reason. In his quest for the origins of religion he encounters the limits of reason and philosophy.​[11]​
	What are the two sources of religion? With this expression, used at several moments in his lecture, Derrida refers to different elements of religion.​[12]​ Since they cannot all be discussed here, I pick out one of them, which I think is one of the most important, one reference to the two sources that also appear to be one: one source that immediately divides itself. It is the source of both reason and religion. Derrida calls it faith.​[13]​ This seems to make the paradox even more complex: at first Derrida says that faith and reason cannot simply be put in an opposition, then he wants to start the discussion of their relation from the perspective of critical enlightened reason, articulating this starting point in terms of both certainty and cautiousness, and then he states that faith is the source of reason and religion. Can this combination of statements reasonably be argued?


3. Quasi-transcendental faith
The idea that rational projects like science and philosophy find their beginning in a certain faith, doesn’t have to be a surprise for those who know the work of Derrida. Isn’t he always harping on the fact that science and philosophy cannot find a foundation in themselves? That every origin is split in itself and every foundation already undermined? This implies that every beginning or starting point of thoughts and actions is not evident. Every argument is, among other things, a testimony of a pre-rational conviction that is not evident, that is open for discussion. What does Derrida tell us specifically about this faith (and how is it related to the faith of religion)? 
	He calls it ‘le gage testimonial de tout performatif’, the testimonial pledge of every performative.​[14]​ Every speech act says to the other: “Believe me, trust me, I cannot proof what I say to you, but I promise to tell you the truth.” This formal structure of belief in what one says and of promising the truth is presupposed by every utterance, it is even at work in a lie or a perjury. Derrida calls this faith, but it is in fact a formal and universal structure that cannot be reduced to a theoretical statement or to a belief. The promise that is inherent in this faith is also linked to the promise of a messianic justice. ​[15]​
	This formal structure of faith as such is undetermined, it has no specific content. This is why Derrida says that this faith is, strictly speaking, not religious. As a purely formal structure this performative character of speech is not yet religious or political or ethical or whatever. Its characteristics can be discussed in religious terms, like e.g. faith, but that doesn’t make this performative structure in itself religious. We are dealing here with a transcendental structure, but one that is transcendental in a strange way.
	Derrida strictly distinguishes the formal structure of faith from religion and religious traditions, in the same way as he makes a distinction between the messianic as a universal structure and several forms of messianism (like Christianity or Marxism). This rigorous distinction is made in view of an absolute openness towards alterity. In a specific religious tradition, e.g. Catholicism, it is relatively clear who the Messiah is, and this carries with it certain more or less fixed expectations with regard to the future. The same goes for a secularized tradition like Marxism, where one can find also more or less determined convictions with regard to the justice to come. Messianisms have specified ‘horizons of expectation’, which determine in advance the alterity of what is to come. And for this reason, according to Derrida, the alterity of the justice to come is here no longer a real alterity, it is no longer absolutely other, since it is already pre-figured by the horizon of expectation.​[16]​ 
	The aim of deconstruction is to prepare a place for the other, an ‘invention of alterity’, by breaking through these horizons of expectation, by undermining and shaking established systems, by problematizing beaten tracks and breaking new ground. We should be open to let the other come without already having a fixed program or an insured road to the future. So Derrida wants to deconstruct religious traditions to make them more open for alterity.​[17]​ By doing this he takes a step back from these religious traditions to their condition of possibility, to the transcendental structure which makes religion possible, i.e. the performative structure of testimony and faith, the undetermined address of the other - an address without any horizon of expectation. A messianic faith waiting for what is absolutely unforeseeable, a faith that tries hard to be as blind as possible for the future. A faith that is so open that it never knows for sure what to believe: “Do you believe?” “I don’t know. One must believe.”​[18]​ A faith that never knows for sure which way to go, that never wants to know where to go. If he knew where he was going, Derrida says, he wouldn’t take any step further.​[19]​
	Of course, this transcendental structure of undetermined address is never given in itself, it cannot be reached in its purity. There is no form without content, no formal structure of faith without its elaboration within a particular tradition. This means that the openness towards alterity can never be complete, that it can only exist in a specific configuration, which already limits the openness. The transcendental performative structure of faith is inscribed in the textual and cultural context of a tradition; therefore it must presuppose what it makes possible: it is a quasi-transcendental structure. It requires a horizon as well as the absence of any horizon. Addressing the other requires a horizon of expectancy and at the same time it requires this horizon to be broken, interrupted by the event of the coming of the other. In other words, every horizon of expectation presupposes its own being fractured. The formal messianic structure of faith makes religion possible and at the same time makes the purity of religion impossible. The transcendental structure of faith is a quasi-transcendental structure: the condition of possibility of religion is also a condition of its impossibility.​[20]​
	The same structure can be found in Derrida’s thoughts on justice. Justice is not founded in some way, but it is still to come. We can seek for justice, by creating laws and rules, but they bring along procedures, languages, calculations, etc., and thereby already suppress alterity. So justice is in need of law, but it is at the same time in need of postponement of law. Justice charges us with a double bind. In seeking for justice we get stuck in an aporia. This is the quasi-transcendental structure of justice.​[21]​


4. At the brink of traditions – in the midst of tradition
With regard to this aporetic structure, Derrida finds himself in an aporetic position. He is looking for the sources of religion, which traditionally are to be found in a desert. A hermit retreats in the desert to look for the pure sources of faith, far away from any religious institution. In this way every religion has its hermits and  ‘its own desert’. Derrida tries to take one step further, to a desert that precedes all these religious deserts, to a desert in a desert. Here he looks for the pure undetermined faith, which is ‘older’ than any religion. But as we have seen, this place can never be reached. So Derrida constantly and infinitely moves between a desert and the desert in the desert. This is an oscillatory movement between religion and the undetermined structure of faith. Derrida, with reference to Heidegger, also calls it a movement between revelation (Offenbarung) and the structure of revealability (Offenbarkeit). In deconstructing or dismantling a specific religion and its revelation, Derrida makes a movement towards a place beyond religion, in order to be able to criticize religion’s dogmas and rituals, in order to open it for other religious experiences, in order to make way for tolerance, and in order to reach, as closely as possible, a relation to alterity without violence, a ‘we’, a friendship of ‘we’ that precedes any community and doesn’t exclude anyone.​[22]​ This strategy has a lot in common with negative or apophatic theology, the theological discourse that speaks about God in denials, saying e.g. that God is not good, because he is better than our expression ‘good’ could ever indicate. Derrida draws the extreme consequences of the apophatic theological discourses by taking them beyond any theology; his strategy can thus be called a ‘general apophatics’.​[23]​
	The desert within the desert is the place where there appears to be no foundation for whatever religious dogma. At the edge of the religious traditions, we find an abyss. This is how Derrida describes his own position in ‘Force of law’: 

“The singularity of the historical place […] allows us a glimpse of the type itself [i.e. the undetermined structure of faith and of the messianic, E.E.], as the origin, condition, possibility or promise of all its exemplifications (messianism of the Jewish, Christian or Islamic type, idea in the Kantian sense, eschato-teleology of the neo-Hegelian, Marxist or post-Marxist type, etc.). It also allows us to perceive and conceive the law of irreducible competition, but from a brink where vertigo threatens to seize us the moment we see nothing but examples and some of us no longer feel engaged in it; another way of saying that from this point on we always run the risk (speaking for myself, at least) of no longer being, as they say, ‘in the running’. But not to be ‘in the running’ on the inside track, does not mean that we can stay at the starting-line or simply be spectators – far from it. It may be the very thing that ‘keeps us moving’, with renewed strength and speed, for example, deconstruction.”​[24]​

At the brink of traditions, that’s a risky position, because it is also on the brink of an abyss. Derrida is balancing here between several religious traditions and a bottomless abyss. His brinkmanship brings us to a place where some waver in their faith, not knowing what to believe anymore, seized by vertigo at the moment they see nothing but examples. There is also the risk of no longer feeling engaged, of just leaving justice and the messiah and all the others to the neighbors: “I have no place, maybe you can sleep in the stable of my neighbor.” Another risk lies in the indefiniteness of what is to be expected, of what is promised and hoped for. The messiah might as well be the devil and going to the desert in the desert one might see only a fata morgana. Derrida’s messianic hope is always also marked by a certain despair and by a fear for what is to come. Perhaps this is the vertigo that threatens him the most: the fear and trembling before the radical evil that might come instead of justice.
	Still, Derrida doesn’t seem to be wavering. What is the faith that keeps him moving, even with renewed strength and speed, deconstruction? Is it a specific faith that keeps him moving and that shows him the way, be it a way towards an aporia, not knowing where to go, at the risk of never arriving?​[25]​ I think it is indeed a specific faith that guides deconstruction. This faith can be found in the lines I quoted at the beginning of this article, in what Derrida called there his ‘provisionally held evidence’, his ‘predilection without reservation’ for a certain Enlightenment, and his ‘unconditional preference’ for emancipating public space from external powers like dogmatics, orthodoxy or religious authority. Here Derrida takes his position within the tradition of the Enlightenment, by putting religious authority under rational critique. The Kantian adage “Dare to think! Have the courage to use your own intelligence!”​[26]​, which implies a critique of every authority and tradition, finds its contemporary compeer in Derrida’s critical deconstructive interrogation of every tradition and messianism. In several texts Derrida places his own thought, with varying certainty, within this tradition of the Enlightenment.​[27]​
	This tradition of rational critique is, of course, even older than the Enlightenment. I started this text with a reference to Parmenides and the distinction between doxa and episteme. He and other pre-Socratics established the project of metaphysics, which I provisionally described as an effort to reach an absolute and encompassing insight into reality by reason alone. This metaphysical project is often criticized, especially in the 20th century. When Derrida discusses the texts that are written in this metaphysical tradition, he criticizes every fixation of a foundation or origin and its totalizing tendencies, often referring to the ‘what is…?’-question as a metaphysical question.​[28]​ This metaphysical mode of thinking is the main victim of his deconstructive strategies. But at the same time he insists that we cannot do without metaphysics, arguing that every effort to end metaphysics is an effort of enclosure, which is in itself, in its very distinction and enclosure, a metaphysical move.​[29]​ For Derrida, thinking non-metaphysically (if it can be named this way) means exactly staying within metaphysics, problematizing it and undermining it from within. Within the quest for a firm foundation and for absolute insight, Derrida shows the necessary shortcomings of this quest: every claim of a fixed foundation or assured distinction is made unstable, uncertain and undecidable by deconstruction.
	By staying within this metaphysical project, Derrida implicitly endorses the two elements of metaphysics that I mentioned: the claim that philosophy should strive for absolute and comprising insight in reality and the claim that this quest should be undertaken by reason alone. The rational metaphysical fixations are attacked by Derrida’s rational critique, because they do not succeed, and they never will be able to succeed in reaching absolute knowledge and absolute insight. Otherwise said, and more precisely: Derrida leads the absolute requests of philosophy and its concepts to their limits, in order to complicate their own conceptual logic, in order to show their being in deconstruction.​[30]​ Within this mode of critique, the absolute mission of metaphysics is still maintained; the demand or appeal that is imposed on philosophy, remains absolute. The quest for foundation and absolute insight has to be continued, although and just because it will never be fulfilled.​[31]​ The absolute is never present but imminent, it always remains to come. Here we find the reason why Derrida often speaks about his own thought as a thinking of the impossible. The absolute should be hoped for and aspired to as something impossible, as impossible and as imminent.​[32]​ In fact we can see here the same oscillatory movement between the desert and the desert in the desert; now it keeps metaphysics going. It is the movement between, on the one hand, the absolute intention of metaphysics that will never be fulfilled, and, on the other hand, the ‘realized’ metaphysical positions that are in deconstruction, because they can never reach their absolute goal.
	In his rational questioning of reason Derrida also criticizes the Kantian idea of a tribunal of reason. He prefers to distinguish deconstruction from critique because he associates the term ‘critique’ with a judgment, maybe even a final judgment, that makes definitive distinctions and oppositions.​[33]​ Derrida does not want to give a final judgment, he wants to deconstruct any judgment again and again, infinitely. Philosophy has an infinite responsibility to keep on questioning everything, to guard the questions and appeals that are put to it; philosophy is the ‘community of the question’.​[34]​ Consequently, in Derrida’s thought, reason in fact still is the ultimate tribunal, but one that infinitely delays the last judgment. He keeps the eternal and immortal metaphysical desire alive, by endlessly pointing at the inevitable mortality and finiteness of every metaphysical position.​[35]​
	This also can explain a strange certainty in Derrida’s thoughts on the messianic, a certain certainty about the uncertainty of the coming of the messiah. Derrida’s hope for messianic justice is as indefinite as possible. The messiah he is preparing a place for, is not some future presence, but the imminence of justice. In stating with certainty that messianic justice is imminent and will always remain imminent, Derrida has created an alternative horizon of expectation. In a paradoxical way he has already fixed some features of the coming justice, while having in mind to get rid of all fixations. To try to expect without a horizon of expectation is in itself a horizon of expectation. This is the faith that keeps deconstruction moving in its oscillatory movement between religious traditions and the abysses in which they think they are rooted. It is a faith in reason that interprets its own finiteness against the background of an absolute and infinite task that it has imposed on itself. ​[36]​
	In his reflection on his own position (or movement) in relation to religious traditions, Derrida gives an ambivalent impression of what he is doing. He often suggests to be at the brink of traditions, on his way to a place outside every tradition, although still linked to certain traditions by the language he unavoidably has to use. But, as I have tried to show, his oscillatory movement is in itself rooted in a specific tradition, namely that of the Enlightenment – a tradition, by the way, that has often understood itself as not belonging to any tradition. Sometimes, Derrida seems to be aware of this. For instance, in the passage on the several messianisms that I cited above, Derrida says, after having sketched messianisms as exemplifications of the formal messianic type, that not to be ‘in the running’ on the inside track of these traditions,

“…may be the very thing that ‘keeps us moving’, with renewed strength and speed, for example, deconstruction.” [my italics, E.E.]

The fact that Derrida is using here again the expression for example can be understood as a sign that the moves of deconstruction, while claiming universal validity, belong themselves to a specific tradition, are themselves examples of the messianic structure. Recently, Derrida has given a clear testimony of his own preference for the Enlightenment as a form of faith. He calls it his faith in the ‘unconditional university’ and in the ‘Humanities of tomorrow’: 

“…the principal right to say everything […] and the right to say it publicly, to publish it. This reference to public space will remain the link that affiliates the new Humanities to the Age of Enlightenment.”​[37]​


5. Force of faith
In his discussion of ‘the principal of reason’, Derrida asks himself if it is reasonable to question reason and the principle of reason in the way he does. He answers that it is more reasonable to confront this question rationally, than to give a forced answer, which might be dogmatic or nihilistic or take a refuge into religious faith.​[38]​ In my opinion, Derrida is right here: since philosophy cannot give itself the firm foundation it has often been looking for, it is not only reasonable but also necessary to explore and trace the limits of reason.
	With his deconstructive interventions Derrida has shown again and again that no philosophical system or position can be completely justified. The rational arguments that are given, are always dependent on specific contexts and horizons and cannot transcend these limits towards an absolute justification. Any argumentation has to end, sooner or later, in a conviction that can only to a degree be supported by rational arguments. The convincing force of the argumentation of a discourse is partly received by such convictions that cannot themselves be proven: let us call them a force of faith (force de foi).​[39]​
	This means that philosophical arguments are partially based on faith, on certainties whose rational foundations and justifications fall too short. These convictions are not actively chosen; the relations we have with them, are passive: we are convinced, because the statements of our convictions appear to be convincing. Of course, rational arguments can be convincing as well, but there is a difference. Rational arguments have the force of a logical necessity, whereas the certainties of convictions are not coercive or compelling, at least not in the same way as logical necessities. Accordingly, the persuasive force of a discourse is not strictly rational – if that were the case, then a foundation would be possible after all – it receives support from rhetoric, prejudices, widely shared suppositions, and so on. Thus, the force of faith does not have to be a religious faith, it can also be atheistic, ideological or just a matter of feeling.​[40]​
	The force of faith at work in philosophy is not necessarily its foundation and does not have to function as a sort of root, although this is possible. The beliefs that can articulate the force of faith are often allied with sources of inspiration, they can best be seen as basic beliefs that guide the lines of thinking within a statement or a philosophical oeuvre without determining them. Philosophical thoughts and theories usually have a number of open ends, they are inscribed in many contexts at the same time, in a way that cannot entirely be guided or manipulated. A discourse includes several traces of meaning, traces that are interwoven with each other, although they might very well contradict each other or form a paradoxical tension. The specific articulation of philosophical thoughts in a text, as Derrida has shown very well, depends not only on the guiding basic beliefs but also on the language that is used, on its style and genre, on the discussions in which it takes part, on the personal situation and history of the writer, on the social and political context, and so forth. All these various elements are constitutive for the way in which the force of faith is elaborated into a philosophical discourse. That is why the meaning and force of the basic beliefs should not be overestimated; they are certainly not as strong as a foundation.​[41]​
	Anyway, there is no way of transcending these convictions to a non-place above the competitive traditions, to a purely formal desert beyond any religious desert. Every effort to place oneself above this competition of traditions is in itself adherent to one of the traditions and is always already by its guiding faith inscribed within the competition. In this way the Enlightenment critique of all faith cannot but give a testimony of its own ‘faith in reason’. In other words, Derrida can never escape the force of faith, not only because his texts will always be inscribed in the language of a messianic tradition, but also, and mainly, because the effort to escape any tradition and reach a desert within the desert, is in itself guided by a powerful faith.
	This metaphysical faith that keeps deconstruction going, the claim that philosophy should strive for absolute and comprising insight in reality, by reason alone – this faith can, as any other belief or certainty, be critically interrogated. This does not mean a step back from radical philosophical critique to a pre-modern faith. On the contrary, radical philosophical questioning of all statements and convictions should be so radical that it also questions its own boundaries and limits. It is not the critical ‘spirit’ of deconstructions or their drive towards openness that should be criticized. Nor is it the fact that it puts every judgment or discourse into perspective, making it finite and putting it under critique. The most problematic in Derrida’s work, is the way he tries to think this finiteness of philosophical thought against the background of an absolute norm and standard, imposed on philosophy. This implicit confidence that reason should strive for the absolute, is neither evident nor convincing. The implicit tendency towards absolute purity is not only what keeps metaphysics and deconstruction moving, it is also their weak spot, depriving them of any orientation and resulting in contrary effects.


6. Tolerance and justice
One of the contrary effects can be shown in what Derrida says about tolerance. Tolerance is one of the aims of Derrida’s apophatic strategies. His excavation of all religious traditions on the way to the ‘desert in the desert’ is meant to make these religions more open and more tolerant. Derrida is looking for a wholly new tolerance beyond that which is, in his eyes, still too much a Christian tolerance. In ‘Faith and knowledge’ he mentions Kant and Voltaire, who have described tolerance as a Christian virtue: without doubt, according to Voltaire, Christianity is of all religions the most tolerant, although Christians have been the most intolerant of all people…​[42]​ The other tolerance, to which deconstruction should clear the path, is supposed to lie beyond Christianity, beyond any religion, in the experience of the ‘desert in the desert’.​[43]​
	Here Derrida suggests that a real or pure tolerance can only be reached if one distances oneself from any religious tradition and denies every religious testimony. This, however, appears to be a contradiction: if tolerance presupposes a denial of any testimony, it is turned over into intolerance. It is far from tolerant to expect oneself and others to renounce any religious belief or conviction. In this way Derrida makes tolerance dependent on a purity that results in the contrary effect of a radical intolerance.
	Tolerance does not need such an absolute purity, it can do without the orientation towards an absolute formal emptiness beyond any tradition. Tolerance is dependent on the recognition of the finiteness and contextuality of ones convictions and beliefs. The idea of an absolute position outside religious traditions does not add anything that is necessary for achieving tolerance. A plea for tolerance is more in need of a support for those religious movements that are not hostile to other beliefs than of a problematizing of every religion just because they can never be tolerant enough.
	The same goes for Derrida’s thoughts on justice. The more the idea of justice is postponed and excavated, the more deconstruction will loose its ethical and political significance. Deconstructions can be used in concrete ethical, juridical and political strategies, but Derrida usually prefers an orientation on the abstract an-archical level, to show that every decision in general is struck by aporias. The result here is that any proposal for a new theory or strategy will be immediately criticized as already too enclosing and in need of a new breakthrough. One can doubt if this strategy really creates more space for a coming of the other.​[44]​
	Here we find a strange paradox in Derrida’s work. It seems to be vulnerable to a critique that has analogues with the deconstruction of metaphysical positions. In his deconstructive strategies he drives several lines of thought within a discourse to their extremes, until they have a meaning that is contrary to the intentions of the author. But now we see that Derrida’s own efforts to make room for alterity, justice and tolerance, when taken to their extremes, as Derrida himself often seems to do, end up in their contraries. Just as Derrida puts forward against Husserl that death is a condition of the possibility of the living consciousness​[45]​, just as he shows that Benjamin’s discourse on the divine violence can be interpreted as a prediction of the shoah​[46]​ – just as a metaphysical position can be turned into its opposition, so can deconstruction lead to the opposite of what it is supposed to bring forward: intolerance instead of tolerance, enclosure instead of inventions of the other. This will be the case when too much emphasis is put on the purity and indetermination of justice and the other, on the inaccessible pole that forms one side of Derrida’s oscillatory movement. The force of faith that keeps deconstruction going between the absolute and the contextual, shows its weak spot in the orientation on the purity of the ‘desert in the desert’, an orientation that tends to deny itself as being an orientation.
	I have tried to show how this orientation functions in Derrida’s text with respect to faith and testimony, as well as sketch some arguments against it. This text, however, as any other, cannot lay bare some ultimate foundation on which its statements and arguments can rely. Neither can I arrange an ultimate tribunal that might judge the thought of a contemporary philosopher. On account of rational arguments no ultimate judgment can be given of what I take as Derrida’s faith. If I would end this discussion of the relation between faith and reason with a testimony or confession, then this confession would be close to Derrida’s faith. I subscribe to Derrida’s certainty that any discourse, opinion, procedure, law, and so on, is and should be criticizable. Even the viewpoint that philosophy should aim at absolute knowledge and absolute purity, falls under rational critique. In other words, this critique should be so radical that also the radicalism of rational critique will be questioned. In this way the radicalism of the metaphysical orientation towards absolute purity can be put in perspective.
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^1	  I want to thank Jason Winfree for his comments and corrections on an earlier version of this text.
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